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APPOINTED COUNSEL FOR THE INDIGENT
CIVIL DEFENDANT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT WITHOUT A JUDICIAL REMEDY?
Michael Boteint
INTRODUOTION

A relatively strong doctrinal basis can be-and has been1constructed for according the indigent civil defendantll a right to
counsel. The courts have, however, totally failed to respond to
the invitation. This seems anomalous, especially in light of the
increasing reliance which has been placed, in recent years, upon
the judiciary for the protection of basic human rights. Is this
judicial reticence due to the insubstantiality of the right asserted i Or is it the product of a judicial inability to implement a
substantial constitutional right ~

I.

STATUS OF THE RIGHT

A. Doctrinal Basis
Support for the indigent civil defendant's right to counsel
can be found under both the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Federal Constitution.
t Instruetor, Brooklyn Law Sehool. B.A. 1966, Wesleyan; J.D. 1969, Cornoll
University.
1 See Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yalo L.J. 545
(1967); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 Colum. L. Rov. 1322
(1966).
2 There are both doetrinal and pragmatic problems in deelaring and imple·
menting a right to counsel for the indigent civil plaintiff.
First, the equal protection argument, see p. 369-70 infra, should presumably apply
to plaintiffs as well as defendants. Nevertheless, the equal proteetion argument,
grounded as it is on criminal cases, might require too extreme an expansion in
order to cover plaintiffs. Moreover, the due proeess argument seems to be applica·
ble only to defendants, due to its emphasis on the seriousness of possible consequences and inability to defend oneself. P. 369-70 infra. As has been suggested, thIs
distinction between plaintiffs and defendants has an illusory and arbitrary' air to
it. Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yale L.J. 545, 551i
(1967). This is not, of eourse, to say that the indigent plaintiff does not also
need help. One eo=entator found that out of 18,724 Distriet of Columbia
cases, judgment was rendered for an indigent plaintiff in only ono. Sehmerz, The
Indigent Civil Plaintiff in The District of Columbia: Faets and Co=entary', 21
Fed. Bar J. 235, 241 (1967).
Seeond, the pragmatic problem of implementing the plaintiff's right to counsel
seems huge even in eomparison to the seemingly insurmountable problems of im.
plementing the defendant's right to counsel. While a court might conceivably bo
able to protect a defendant against the effects of his own non-appearance, p. 315
infra, it obviously cannot even attempt to do so with a plaintiir, since it has no
means of knowing his grievance. Thus the plaintiff can be helped only by an
affirmative publicity and education program-action clearly only within legislative
capabilities.
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The equal protection argument proceeds basically from Griffin, v. Illinois. 3 There the Court held that an IDinois statute which

conditioned appeal in a criminal case on the defendant's ability
to buy a trial transcript violated the equal protection clause.
The Court reasoned that even though the statute was fair on its
face and fairly administered, it was discriminatory in its effect,
since it denied to a poor man that which was available to a rich
man. In so doing, the Court recognized a totally new type of
discrimination.4 The indigent civil defendant is subject to just
such a discrimination. The operation of a statute which allows a
landlord to evict, or a conditional vendor to recover, discriminates in its effect between a poor man and a rich man; the latter
will be able to hire counsel to raise his defenses while the former
will not.5 This discrimination is just as invidious as that involved
in Griffin.6
The due process argument is based on the theory that a de3 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Like the indigent civil defendant, petitioner Griffin was
not, in theory, totally barred from appellnte review by his lack of funds. Only a
bill of exceptions, certified by the trial court, was actually required; this could
not, however, usually be drawn up without a trllllSeript. 351 U.S. at 13.
Griffin may, to some extent, be based upon both equal protection and due
process reasoning. The plurality spoke in terms of "[b]oth equal protection and
due process," 351 U.S. at 17, and ten years later the ~urt treated Griffin tIS
having been decided under both provisions. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.s. 305 (1966).
The holding may technically be based solely on equal protection, since Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, who cast the deciding vote, based his concurriDg opinion solely on
equal proteetion, 351 U.S. 21·22. Nevertheless, some overtone of a duo proce':3
violation is probably necessary to briDg a ease within the Griffin formulation. The
case of the indigent civil defendant comes withln such overtones. See p. 310 infrn.
4 Thns, under the Griffin formulation seemmgly innocent government activities,
such as highway tolls and water charges, might seem to be invalid. But see, Note,
Diseriminations Against The Poor and The Fourteenth Amendment, 81 lInrv. L.
Rev. 435, 438·39 (1961).
5 Also, the presence of counsel will greatly iDereaso chances of settlement.
Schmerz, The Indigent Civil PlaintUf in the District of ~lumbin: Facts and Commentary, 21 Fed. Bar d. 235, 241 (1961).
6 The only seemmgly legitimate state goal in denyiDg counsel to the iDdigent
would be husbanding its taxpayers' funds. PreventiDg the poor from exercising
their legal rights hardly seems to be a valid exerciso of polico power. See Escobedo
v. TIlinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964). Though the cost to government of recognizing a
right is probably an important part of a finding of invidiousness, Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and The Fourteenth Amendment, 81 lInrv. L. Rey. 435,
440-41 (1967), the cost involved here does not appear to bo c:s:orbitant. Note, tho
Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yale L.J". 545, 551 (1961). ~nyerwly,
the impact of a judgment on the indigent civil defendant may bo severe. Note,
The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 ~lum. L. Rev. 1322, 1332·33 (1066).
Moreover, diseriminating against defendants on the basis of their financial situation
may be inherently invidious. Wealth may be a "forbidden" or nt least "suspect"
classification, Tussman &; TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif.
L. Rev. 341, 353·56 (1949), and thus invalid. Harper v. Vll'ginin Bd. of Elec·
tions, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). Or a discrimination on tho basis of wealth may bo
likened to a racial diserimination, since tho two nre so intertwined toany. HarriDgton, The Economies of Protest in Employment, Race, and Poverty 234, at 245046 (A.
Ross ed. 1967).

370

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36 :368

fendant needs counsel in a civil case just as much as in a criminal
case. First, the consequences of losing a civil case may be as
severe as those of losing a criminal case;7 physical incarceration
should not be accorded such talismanic status, since economic
oppression can equally inflict basic human misery.s Second, the
average layman can probably conduct his own defense less capably in a civil than in a criminal case.9 As a result, the indigent
civil defendant should fall within the due process guidelines
used by the Court in establishing the right to counsel in criminal
cases.10

B. Judicial Response
So far, the courts have seemed somewhat less than anxious to
build upon this comparatively sturdy doctrinal foundation. The
7 Supra note 6. Due process emphasis on the impact upon tho individual might
require a restriction of the right to "serious" cases-like the restriction onco im·
posed in criminal cases by Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Noto, Tho Indigent's
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yale L.J. 545, 553 (1967); Noto, Tho Right to
Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1322, 1332 (1966). Equal protoction
might require a similar restriction, on the theory that a small recovery, though
perhaps discriminatory, would not be invidious. There is probably, in fact, a high
degree of congruence between the due process concept of shockingneBB and tho
equal protection concept of invidiousness. Note, Discriminations Against tho Poor
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 435, 438 (1967).
8 The Court has shown at least some tendencY to disregard traditional distinc'
tions between" civil II and "criminal II cases. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967);
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (juvenile delinquencY proceed.
ings); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961) (habeas corpus proceedings).
According a due process right to counsel to the indigent civil defendant obviously
involves the further-and perhaps more involved-step of disregarding the distinction between physical and financial oppression. The Court has very recently mado at
least a tentative move in this direction. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 38 U.S.L.W. 4223
(1970), the Court held that welfare recipients were entitled, as a mattor of pro·
cedural due process, to a hearing before termination of their benefits. Tho Court
reasoned that due process guarantees were applicable becauso of tho possible harm
to the individual recipient. The Court was, however, deliberately vaguo as to what
type of hearing was required; whether this rationale will be extended to tho pro·
viding of appointed counsel in other civil proceedings is unclear.
9 The average criminal defendant may, in fact, be better ablo to undorstand
and defend his case than his civil counterpart. Most laymen havo at loast a rudi·
mentary acquaintance with the criminal process through the mass media, whereas
few have had any real exposure to the often more complex civil process. Tho avorago
citizen probably knows more about gradations of homicide than about tho doctrino
of consideration. See Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yalo
L.J. 545, 548 (1967).
10 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68·69 (1932) first laid down tho duo process
analysis. In Betts v. Brady, 315 U.S. 453 (1942) the Court followed this test,
though severely restricting the right to counsel. More recently, in Gideon v. Wain.
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) the Court relied upon the sixth amendment-which
confines the right to "all criminal prosecutions "-to an indeterminato degreo. The
Ceurt never explicitly held, however, that the sixth amendment was incorporated
into the fourteenth, but said merely that the former's guarantees wero so funda.
mental as to be a part of the latter. In fact, the opinion in Gideon quoted exten.
sively from the Powell formulation. 372 U.S. at 344-45. But seo Pointer v. Toxas,
380 U.S. 400, 408·09 (1965) (Harlan, J. concurring).
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Supreme Court had the opportunity to pass upon the issue in
two cases which presented it somewhat tangentially, but it
denied certiorari in both cases.u Both cases sparked some disagreement on the Court but produced no clear statement as to
the indigent civil defendant's right to counsel.12
Perhaps more interesting are the cases in which lower state
and federal courts have grappled with different but related
issues. In In Re Ghambers,13 the court held that where a child
was ordered removed from its parents, the parents had a right
not only to a transcript but also to counsel on appeal. The court
based its decision not on any constitutional mandate, but rather
on a close construction of the state appeals statutes, despite the
fact that, on its face, the statutory language mandated no such
resnlt.14 The court was, moreover, not unaware of the constitutional dimensions of the issue; it quite explicitly skirted them.lli
Its reasoning on the transcript issue was expressly adopted
quite soon thereafter in another state,11l whose statutes also did
not mandate any such resnlt,l1 The approach of both cases is
11 Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967); Sandoval v. lmttiliin, 385 U.s.
901 (1966).
12 Neither case explicitly raised the issue. The Willinms case chnUenged the
validity of a Georgia statute requiring defendants in eviction nctions to post II. bond
pending the proceedings. Somewhat more in point, the Sandovnl case EOught to
overturn a foreclosure judgment recovered ngninst poor people who were represented by allegeaIy ineffective county·supplied counsel The Intter cam ECems to
have really involved the issue of whether incompetenco of counsel-whether ratained or appointed-was grounds for reversal in !l. civil case. The mnjority in tho
Texas court held that defendants' counsel was in fnct, effective. Sandovnl v. nnttiliin.
395 S.W.2d 889, 895 (TeL Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied 385 U.s. 901 (1900). Tho
lone dissenter explicitly side-stepped the question of whether defendants hnd II.
constitutional right to counsel in the Drst pInce. Id. nt 895, 913 (Shnrpe, J. diEsunt·
ing). And the opinion of Mr. Justice Fortns, dissenting from deninl of certiorari,
seemed directed more at the question of effectiveness than nt tho question of tho
right to counsel Cf. Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil CtlSc-". 76 Yalo
L.J. 545, 54546 (1967).
13 152 N.W.2d 818 (Iowa. 1967).
14 Iowa. Code .Ann. ch. 232.28 (West 1969) gavo II. right to appointed counscl
in juvenile proceedings. It did not, however, refer to nppellate proceedings, and
the context--i.e. trial procedures-appenred to point more townrds trial than nppel·
late counseL Ch. 232.52 provided for "reasonable compensation" for nppointed
counsel, but only upon "certification of tho judge"--once ngain, pointing in tho
direction of trial counseL Ch. 232.32 just required II. court reporter. and was totnll;r
silent on the transcript issue.
15 The court said that the due process requirements of In ne Gnult, 387 U.s.
1 (1967) might be applicable to other proceedings involving chUdrun. 11)2 N.W.2d
at 821-22. It overlooked possible application of the Griflin formulntion. See Douglns
v. California, 372 U.s. 353 (1963).
16 In Be Karren, 280 Minn. 377, 159 N.W.2d 402 (1968). Cf. Lee v. McKay.
414 S.W.2d 956 (TeL aiv. App. 1967). which used similar statutory conmuction to
require a transcript in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The case is p3rticulnrly
interesting in that it was decided only five days before In Be Gault, 387 U.s. 1
(1967), which indicated that providing II. transcript might be required as n. mnttcr
of constitutional right. 387 U.S. at 58.
17 Minn. Stat. .Ann. §§ 260.161(1), 260.041(3) (West Supp. lOG9) did not ra-
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perhaps most interesting in light of one commentator's suggestion that statutory construction could serve as a low risk vehicle
for judicial experimentation with the right to counsel.18
This technique was, however, rejected in a New York lower
court decision, Jeffreys v. J effreys.19 The court passed up an
easy opportunity to hold that publication costs in a divorce
action were covered by the broad language of an in forma pauperis statute.20 Instead, it went on to hold that under Griffin the
publication requirement discriminated in its effect against poor
people, since they could not afford the fees while more affluent
people could.21 The court's action in Jeffreys is especially
striking in light of the fact that the court had, in a prior hearing,
held that plaintiff's claim for fees was within the statute,22 and
that another lower New York court was later to reach the same
conclusion.23
quire a record of any type, but allowed juvenile court judges, at their discretion,
to appoint a court reporter. The statutory construction here was thus ovon moro
strained than in the Chambers case.
It is interesting to note that though the courts are only now aiding tho indigont
to acquire necessary litigation aids, they have long struck down, undor stato constitutional provisions, barriers created by court costs. See, e.g., Lowis v. Smith,
21 R.I. 324, 43 A. 542 (1899) (surety bond for costs on appeal); City of Manitowoc v. Manitowoc and Northern Traction Co., 145 Wis. 13, 129 N.W. 925 (1911)
(injunction issued only on condition of posting $5000 bond ponding appeal). It is
perhaps ironic that the courts have been so quick to remove intornal barriors and
so slow to attack external ones.
18 Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yalo L.J. 545, 557
(1967).
19 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
20 N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & Rules § 1102(a) (McKinney 1963) [horoinaftor citod
as CPLR]. The court reasoned since the statutory language had not boon changod,
and since it had never been thought to include publication fees, it could not thon
be read to include such. 58 Misc. 2d at 1048·50, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 79·81.
A grant of counsel under the statute would appear to be subject to certain
limitations which might be inappropriate under equal protection. CPLR § 1101(a)
(McKinney 1963) requires that the petitioner show a meritorious case. This would
seem to be invalid under the equal protection clause, sinco it would givo tho rich
man a right to pursue frivolous defenses but deny it to the poor man. Cf. Coppodgo
v. United States, 369 U.S. 338, 348 (1962).
21 58 Misc. 2d at 1053·56, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 85·87. This reasoning was rojoctod
in Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968) in a challengo to a
similar Connecticut pUblication requirement. The court thero based its decision on
the difference between criminal and civil cases, and on the stato's intorest in sup'
porting its courts and discouraging frivolous actions.
22 Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 57 Misc. 2d 416, 292 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ot. 1968). Tllo
court had said firmly that: "The statutory authority for tho granting of tho rollef
requested is clear. It is therefore unnecessary to rule that denial of access to tho
court to poor persons, while granting such access to those able to afford tho cost
of publication, might constitute a denial of equal protection ••• " 57 Misc. 211 at
417, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 768. The court's later position may have been ospecially
anomalous in light of the fact that CPLR § 1102, being in derogation of tho common law, had been held to require a strict construction. King Kullen Grocory Co. v.
Astor, 249 App. Div. 657, 291 N.Y.S. 487 (2d Dep't 1936).
23 Brown v. Wyman, 59 Misc. 2d 740, 300 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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Thus the courts have almost consistently attempted to avoid
the broad constitutional issue posed by the indigent civil defendant's lack of counsel. Attributing this to a lack of doctrinal
support for the right is an incomplete explanation. The right is
well within the bounds of precedent, and its recognition would
entail only doctrinal change, with no need for the costly overruling or involved distinguishing of prior cases.
Judicial inaction here may at least partially be based upon
judicial inability to implement the right. A court would, understandably enough, be loathe to create an unenforceable right.~"
The question, therefore, becomes whether the courts do, in fact,
have the ability to implement the indigent civil defendant's
right to counsel.

II. F ASIDONING

THE REMEDY

The cornerstone of any such system must rest upon the
proposition that to render a judgment against an indigent defendant who lacks counsel is, in itself, unconstitutional. Judicial
action is state action, and thus a judgment which deprives a
person of a constitutional right is itself unconstitutional.211 This,
of course, raises a problem as to what steps must be taken in
order that counsel will be deemed to have been made available
to the indigent-or, stated conversely, what action will be
deemed to be a waiver of the right to counsel. On both a doctrinal
and a pragmatic level, it would seem reasonable to analogize to
criminal cases and require that the defendant be given clear
notice of his right to counsel and that he unambiguously waive
that right.26
24 Note, Diserlminations Against The Poor and the Fourtl!enth Amendment,
81 Harv. L. Rev. 435, 443 (1967).
25 In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court hl!ld that n judge could
not enforce a racially diserlminatory restrictive covenant, sinco his nction -rrould
constitute governmental enforcement of discriminn.tion and th&eby viomte the cqunl
protection clause. :Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) extended the rule to
actions at la-rr. Analytically, these cases difi'&ed from the situation h&e nt hand,
since they involved a more traditional, express type of discriminntion. Their ban on
judicial action should, howev&, apply in this situation, sinco both situations in·
volve court action -rrhich violates a right guaranteed by the l!qunl protl!ction
clause.
26 Infra note 47. The strict criminal m-rr standard for n mUV& of connsel,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966), might have to bo rclrutcd h&c.
Since the main problem with the indigent civil defendant is that he does not appear, it would be quixotic to require such a detniled inquiry into the clrcumstance3
of a waiV&; it would amonnt to requiring that the defendant be brought bOdily
before the court.
This also poses the problem ef identifying the smge in the proceedings at -rrhich
the defendant's right to counsel should be deemed to attnch. If, in fnct, the right
is to have any real value, it -rrould seem necessary that it accrue substantinUy before
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Given this ban on judicial action where an indigent is without
counsel, there appear to be three basic ways of vindicating his
right to counsel. First, the defendant may simply be allowed to
litigate his case again-this time with the assistance of counsel.
Second, he may be given an affirmative cause of action to compensate him for his lack of counsel. Third, and obviously the
most desirable, the courts may be able to ensure that he is
accorded counsel when the action first arises.
In the rare case where a defendant has actually appeared,
there should be no problem in giving him a chance to relitigate
his case; by analogy to criminal cases, lack of counsel at trial
should be grounds for reversal either per se21 or at least on a
showing that counsel was necessary.28 More commonly, however,
the defendant will not appear29-or, even be served8°-thus
making it necessary to open a default judgment. In many cases
this should be possible on the purely statutory ground of excusable neglect, due to ignorance and lack of counse1.31 Where
this ground is unavailable, it may be possible to argue that the
rendering of a judgment in violation of the fourteenth amendment ousts a court of its subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore void.s2
Secondly, defendant might be given an affirmative cause of
action against the parties involved in depriving him of his right
to counsel. This could take two possible forms. First, the old but
trial, since counsel is-especially in light of settlement possibilities-perhaps most
needed then. Probably the most convenient line of demarcation would bo either
service of summons or granting of a. provisional remedy boforo service. What is
involved, therefore, is in a sense analogous to the attaching of a. right to counsel
in criminal cases at a "critical stage." Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 270
(1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (under Powoll, counsel
necessary at line·up).
Consistent with this approach, tho right should continue on appeal. Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
21 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
28 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); see Note, Tho Right to Counsel in
Civil Litigation, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1322, 1339 (1966).
29 At present, for example, less than :five percent of tho defendants in eviction
proceedings appear. Conference on Tenants' Rights, Tenants Rights: Legal Tools
For Better Rousing 8 (1967).
30 P. Wald, Law and Poverty: 1965 18 (1965).
31 CPLR § 5015(a)(1) (McKinney 1963). Gallo v. Bosco, 13 App. Div. 2d 982,
216 N.Y.S.2d 501 (2d Dep't 1961).
32 CPLR 5015(a) (4) (McKinney 1963). "Jurisdiction to decido is jurisdiction
to make a. wrong as well as a. right decision." Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1,
14 (1944). What is involved here however, is not just an erroneous docision, but
rather an unconstitutional use of judicial power. The rendering of a judgment
will, as in Shelley and Barrows, per se go beyond the court's authority. Tho situa.
tion is distinguishable from that in Chicot County Drainago Dist. v. Baxtor
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940), which held that a subsequont striking down of a
statute under which a court had rendered a decree did not void tho decreo. In that
case the issue was whether the holding of unconstitutionality was retroactive l horo
any judgment rendered is unconstitutional when rendered.
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still vigorous Civil Rights Acts might be invoked':l3 Second, a
tort remedy could be created.34 Though technically a simple
matter, this approach may produce unfair results by subjecting
good faith plaintiffs to an action and liability for doing no more
than attempting to enforce their own legal rights.3G Moreover, it
would be of very questionable utility to the defendant, since
people who initially default are unlikely to later retain counsel
to prosecute an affirmative action.
Traditional means of implementing personal rights will obviously not be effective here. The core of the indigent civil defendant's problem is that he cannot be relied upon to protect
himself. Thus, any system which is to truly protect him must, in
effect, operate without him. The issue then becomes whether the
courts, without a massive legislative program, are capable of
doing so.
Given the fact that a court should recognize its inability to
proceed, or at least to render judgment,36 where the defendant
is indigent, the realistic problem is bringing the defendant's indigence to the court's attention. Where defendant appears in
the action, this obviously presents little difficulty; the court need
only make a speedy inquiry. Since the vast majority of defendants will, however, never appear, it is necessary to create a
method whereby the court can, on its own, inquire into the defendant's financial situation.
33 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1964) provides nn action for dnmnges agninst nnyono
who conspires to deprive another of, inter a1in, the equnl protection of tho law. Tho
main problem here is to make out the stato action nnd tho conspiracy. Acts of
the plaintiff's lawyer do not constitute state action. Meier v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 356 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1966). Acts of the judge, however, might be. But this
still leaves the question of conspiracy. Although a conspiracy between public
officials and private citizens would suffice, United States v. Price, 383 U.s. 787, 794(1966), a judge, because of his position nnd traditional immunity, cannot bo held
as a conspirator for the purposes of the statute. Agnew v. Mooily, 330 F.2d 868
(9th Cir. 1964).
34 This could be approached in two ways. First, if a judgment against a defendant who lacks counsel is void, see note 25 supra, nny actions under tho judgment might cease to be privileged and thus be tortious. Since tho judgment would,
however, presumably be regular on its face tho privilego would probably not bo
lost.
Second, the courts might simply ereate a new torl; as was onco dono in tho caw
of unreasonable searches and seizures. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.s. 25, 30 n.1
(1949).
35 This would be especially unfair where defendant did not havo a valld defenso
to begin with. Though the mere denial of counsel might technically bo within 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1964), it would seem reasonable to requiro that defendant show
the probability of a valid defense.
36 It is not clear, under Shelley and Barrows, whether tho commencement nnd
prosecution of an action are, in themselves, enough to constitute state action; both
cases involved discrimination created only by tho rendering of a judgment. 334 U.s.
at 13. It seems reasonable, however, that all phases of tho proceeding shonld como
under the ban, since the right should attach at all times, note 26 supra, nnd tho
defendant may be oppressed at all phases.
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Under present law, the only approach seems to be through
some form of judicial notice. Plaintiff's return of service will
show defendant's address, if that is relied upon for venue,87 and,
in any event, the place where defendant was served.8s With this
information as a starting point, the court should be able to take
judicial notice of the character of defendant's neighborhood.
First, basic facts about the economic level of an area within the
jurisdiction of the court should be considered common knowledge.39 Second, since the court may take notice of the acts of
local governmental bodies,4° it should be able to observe which
neighborhoods have been designated as slums41 or as areas in
need of upgrading.42 If defendant appears to come from a lowincome area, the court could then require plaintiff to show either
that defendant was not indigent or that he had been apprised
of his right to counsel.
Though perhaps technically feasible, such a system would
not only impose unfair burdens on plaintiffs43 but would also be
quite erratic in its operation.44 To make it work effectively and
fairly would require a comprehensive file on each individual's
financial status against which each summons could be checked,
possibly by computer. .Any such system obviously involves largescale legislative action and is thus beyond the reach of the courts
alone.
A more realistic approach would be for the courts to exercise
their general rule-making powers4G to require that all summonses
carry an easily understood, perhaps multi-lingual, notice that
appointed counsel was available. This would, at least in situa87 E.g., CPLR § 305(11.) (McKinney 1963).
38 E.g., CPLR § 306 (McKinney 1963).
39 C. McCormick, Evidence 690 (1954); see Van Vliet & Place Inc. v. Gnine!l,
221 App. Div. 538, 542, 224 N.Y.S. 481 (1st Dep't 1927) (notice of prevnlence of
restrictive covenants in New York City).
40 E.g., CPLR § 4511(b) (McKinney 1963).
41 N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 504 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
42 N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 505 (McKinney 1965). Fix v. Rochester, 50 Misc. 2d
660, 271 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
43 Where defendant is not indigent, plaintiff should be able to show that fact fairly
easily, since his dealings with defendant will probably have given him somo imU·
cation of his financial status. Where, however, defendant is indigent, the problem
would be more difficult for plaintiff, since he would have to show that defendant
had been apprised of his right to counsel. In effect, the latter situation would
put plaintiff into the somewhat anomalous position of hnving to notify the defendant of his rights.
44 There are two main problems here. First, defendants may resido or bo
served in a low-income area when he is actually not indigent, or vico vorsa. Second,
the practices of many merchants who deal with the poor are already shoddy onough
that falsification of a retnrn of service would probably be minor by comparison.
Supra note 30.
45 CPLR §§ 212(5), 229 (McKinney Supp. 1969).

1970]

RIGHT TO aOUNSEL

377

tions where service is actually made,46 increase the probability
that defendant would seek counsel. Such notice may, in fact, be
constitutionally required, by analogy to criminal cases ;47 giving
a person a right to counsel makes little sense if he is not clearly
informed of it.
CONCLUSION

The courts are, therefore, virtually powerless to implement
on their own any meaningful right to counsel for the indigent
civil defendant. .An abstract recognition of the right might, as
one commentator has suggested, encourage both private and
legislative legal services programs ;48 It might, however, just end
up a mockery. A haphazard system of implementation might
pressure the plaintiffs' bar and its clientele into the somewhat
anomalous position of lobbying for comprehensive legal services;
it might also provoke large-scale rejection of both the courts and
their program.
This is not to say that the courts must assume a totally passive role. The basic nature of the judiciary prevents positive
action, but the courts can still perform their traditional role of
counselling, encouraging, and occasionally even prodding not
only their co-ordinate branches, but also the public.
46 This would be just another argument in favor of entrusting service of procC33
solely to court officials.
41 Such notice would at least partially fulJill the criminal law'a requirement
that a person be given affirmative notiee of his right to counsel. Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967); Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.s. 258, 2GO (19G7);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471, 473 (1966); .Tohnson v. Zerbsl; 304 U.s.
458, 465 (1938). This requirement apparently must be £ulJilled even whero a person
has some idea of the right. In Be Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42 (1967).
48 Note, The Indigent's Bight to Counsel in Civil Cnsc..~ 76 Yalo L..T. 545, 547,
552 (1967).

